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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal we must decide if New Jersey's 
implementation of a portion of the Medicare Catastrophic 
Coverage Act ("MCCA" or the "Act") violates Federal law. 
Specifically, we must determine whether New Jersey may 
employ an "income-first" approach, rather than a "resource- 
first" approach, when determining Medicaid eligibility for a 
spouse who is institutionalized in a long-term care facility. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
Thomas and Carolyne Cleary, representing themselves 
and a class of persons similarly situated, sued the New 
Jersey Department of Health Services to enjoin application 
of its "income-first" rule. They contend that the New Jersey 
rule violates the MCCA when it attributes a portion of 
Thomas Cleary's income to his wife (income-first method) 
instead of allowing the couple to dedicate more of their 
resources to Carolyne Cleary's support (resource-first 
method). The Clearys argue that the Federal statute 
mandates a "resource-first" approach and that the New 
Jersey rule is an impermissible construction of the Act. In 
denying the Clearys' motion for injunctive relief, the District 
Court held that the income-first method is a permissible 
interpretation of the MCCA. 
 
When the Clearys brought this action, Thomas Cleary 
was 79 years old and suffering from Parkinson's disease 
and dementia. On November 21, 1995, Thomas entered a 
long-term care facility in New Jersey. A year later, Carolyne 
Cleary sought Medicaid benefits on behalf of her husband 
and, pursuant to the Act, requested an assessment of the 
couple's assets by the Passaic County Board of Social 
Services. The board determined that the Clearys' total 
resources had been worth $240,000 at the time of Thomas' 
institutionalization and assessed the then-current value of 
their assets as $180,000. 
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Under the Spousal Impoverishment Provisions ("SIP") of 
the MCCA, 42 U.S.C. S 1396, et seq., several steps are 
taken when a couple applies for Medicaid benefits to cover 
the care of a spouse who has been institutionalized. First, 
the state must calculate the total value of the couple's 
resources and allocate a share of the resources to each 
spouse. 42 U.S.C. S 1396r-5(c)(1). The amount allocated to 
the community spouse is called the Community Spouse 
Resource Allowance ("CSRA").1 This amount then need not 
be spent for the care of the institutionalized spouse. 
 
The income generated from the CSRA, along with the 
community spouse's other income, such as social security, 
makes up the community spouse's Minimum Monthly 
Maintenance Needs Allowance ("MMMNA"). The MMMNA is 
a level of income which has been estimated by the state as 
necessary to permit the non institutionalized spouse to live 
independently in the community. If either spouse is 
dissatisfied with the CSRA, he or she may request a "fair 
hearing." 42 U.S.C. S 1396r-5(e). The Clearys challenge New 
Jersey's method of revising the CSRA when it, along with 
the community spouse's other sources of income, is 
insufficient to meet the MMMNA. 
 
The issue that divides the parties to this appeal is the 
question of what constitutes the community spouse's other 
sources of income. According to the Clearys, the Act 
provides that any shortfall between the MMMNA and the 
amount available to the community spouse as income is to 
be made up by the substitution of another CSRA, i.e., a 
larger portion of the couple's joint resources is to be 
attributed to the community spouse. The income from such 
a reallocated amount, along with the community spouse's 
other income, should then be sufficient to meet the 
MMMNA. This is the "resource-first" approach. However, in 
New Jersey, before reformulating a CSRA with a larger 
share of resources, the fair hearing officer will consider a 
contribution of income from the institutionalized spouse to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The CSRA is the greatest of (a) $12,000, (b)  the lesser of one-half 
total 
joint resources or $60,000, (c) an amount established pursuant to a fair 
hearing under subsection (e)(2) or (d) and amount transferred under 
court order. 42 U.S.C. S 1396r-5(f)(2)(A). 
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make up the shortfall between the MMMNA and the 
community spouse's other income. This is the "income-first" 
approach. 
 
At the time she applied for Medicaid benefits for her 
husband, Carolyne Cleary was informed that Thomas was 
ineligible due to the couple's excess resources. Therefore, 
the Clearys were required to "spend down" their resources 
below a certain level before they could become eligible for 
Medicaid. Prior to the MCCA, an individual had to spend 
down all his or her resources before eligibility. The MCCA 
altered this by providing a protected spousal share of 
resources for the non-institutionalized or "community" 
spouse. 
 
Pursuant to the Act, New Jersey determined that 
Carolyne Cleary was entitled to $1,524.50 per month as her 
MMMNA. At the time of the assessment, Mrs. Cleary's total 
monthly income was $828.25 ($516.50 in social security 
payment and $311.75 in interest from her CSRA). Thus, 
her income fell short of her MMMNA by $696.25. 
 
Under New Jersey's income-first approach, this shortfall 
should be remedied by taking a portion of Thomas Cleary's 
income to be included as part of Carolyne Cleary's. Only 
after this step, will New Jersey look to other assets of the 
Clearys to augment Carolyne Cleary's income. The Clearys 
contend that this method does not conform to the 
provisions of the Act and that Thomas' income cannot be 
transferred to Carolyne. The Clearys assert that New Jersey 
must make up the MMMNA shortfall by allocating a larger 
portion of the couple's resources to Carolyne's CSRA. 
 
The Clearys filed suit in the District Court seeking 
injunctive relief from application of the income-first rule. 
The District Court denied their motion and granted motions 
to intervene by the New Jersey Association of Health Care 
Facilities and the New Jersey Association of Nonprofit 
Homes for the Aging.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Clearys also sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the 
District 
Court on the issue of their right to be notified under the Act of the 
requirements and procedures for eligibility for Medicaid. The District 
Court denied injunctive relief on this issue as well. The Clearys, 
however, 
are not appealing the notice issues. 
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II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and 18 U.S.C. S 1331. The 
Clearys filed an interlocutory appeal from the District 
Court's denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. 
We have jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292(a)(1). 
 
We review the denial of a preliminary injunction for an 
abuse of discretion. However, the District Court'sfindings 
of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. 
New Jersey Hosp. Ass'n v. Waldman, 73 F.3d 509, 512 (3d 
Cir. 1995). After applying the same standard as the District 
Court, we will find an abuse of discretion only upon 
concluding that the District Court's view was contrary to 
reason. U.S. v. A.R., 38 F.3d 699 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
The Clearys contend that New Jersey's income-first rule 
violates the MCCA because it requires couples to allocate 
income from the institutionalized spouse for the 
maintenance of the community spouse, rather than 
designating a further portion of the couple's resources to 
create income for the community spouse. In effect, New 
Jersey requires couples to keep a greater portion of their 
resources available for "spend down" on medical care, 
thereby postponing Medicaid eligibility. 
 
The Clearys argue that this method of revision violates 
both the letter and the spirit of the MCCA. We conclude 
that the MCCA, as interpreted by the federal and state 
agencies charged with its administration, grants states the 
discretion to employ either an income-first or a resource- 
first method when revising the CSRA. We will, therefore, 
affirm the decision of the District Court. 
 
Because this appeal turns on the interpretation of a 
Federal statute, we will first examine the language of the 
statute and the context in which this particular dispute 
arises. Medicaid was established in 1965. While it is often 
thought of as providing medical care only for the indigent, 
it also provides coverage for the aged "whose income and 
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resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary 
medical services" including nursing home care. 42 U.S.C. 
S 1396, et seq. 
 
Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state venture through 
which the states operate programs of their own design. 
These programs must, however, be consistent with federal 
standards and regulations. 42 U.S.C.A. S 1396a(a)(1-5), 
(a)(10)(A, C), (a)(13)(B), (a)(17). The Federal agencies 
responsible for administering the Act, the Health Care 
Financing Administration ("HCFA") and the Department of 
Health and Human Services ("HHS"), have not adopted 
formal regulations interpreting the specific provisions at 
issue here. Rather, these agencies have left it to the states 
to decide whether to consider an institutionalized spouse's 
income or resources in making adjustments to the standard 
resource allowance for community spouses. At the state 
level in New Jersey, it is the Division of Medical Assistance 
and Health Services (DMAHS) and the New Jersey 
Department of Human Services (DHS) which administer 
Medicaid. N.J.S.A. 30:40D-4. 
 
In order to be eligible for Medicaid, a person's available 
income and resources may not exceed certain limits. 
Persons seeking eligibility for Medicaid benefits must 
"spend down" their available assets to the prescribed limits 
before becoming eligible. 42 U.S.C. S 1396 (a)(10). Prior to 
1988, these eligibility rules forced couples to spend down 
the entirety of their resources in order for one of them to 
qualify for Medicaid. This resulted in the virtual 
impoverishment of the spouse who remained in the 
community. 
 
In 1988, Congress enacted the MCCA, H.R. 2470, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 102 Stat. 683 (1988). The chief purpose of 
the MCCA was to end the "pauperization [of the community 
spouse] by assuring that [she] has a sufficient -- but not 
excessive -- amount of income and resources available" 
while the other spouse is institutionalized. H.R. Rep. No. 
105 (II), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 888. The goal of the MCCA 
was to provide sufficient income and resources for the 
community spouse while also ensuring that a fair share of 
the couple's resources were employed for the care of the 
institutionalized spouse. Through its Spousal 
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Impoverishment Provisions, the MCCA set aside a protected 
level of income and resources for the community spouse. 
This amount is "protected" since it is not included when 
determining the institutionalized spouse's eligibility for 
Medicaid and it need not be "spent down" on the 
institutionalized spouse's care. 
 
Because Medicaid serves the purpose of providing 
necessary medical services for both the indigent and the 
elderly, a related goal of the MCCA is to preclude couples 
who possessed substantial resources from qualifying for 
Medicaid. By sheltering a portion of their shared resources 
in trusts or in the community spouse's name, a couple 
might appear to have fewer resources, making them eligible 
for Medicaid. The 1988 Act curbed this sheltering practice 
by attributing certain amounts of the couple's overall 
resources to each spouse for eligibility purposes. The MCCA 
seeks to achieve a balance between spousal 
impoverishment and apportioning medical costs 
appropriately. It does this through a series of complex and 
interlocking provisions. 
 
The statutory provision at issue in this case is S 1396r- 
5(e)(2)(C) of the Spousal Impoverishment Provisions of the 
MCCA. This section governs revisions to the resources 
allotted to the community spouse. 
 
       REVISION OF COMMUNITY SPOUSE RESOURCE 
       ALLOWANCE. -- If either such spouse establishes that 
       the community spouse resource allowance (in relation 
       to the amount of income generated by such an 
       allowance) is inadequate to raise the community 
       spouse's income to the minimum monthly needs 
       allowance, there shall be substituted, for the 
       community spouse resource allowance under 
       subsection (f)(2), an amount adequate to provide such 
       a minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) (emphasis added). 
 
We must determine what constitutes the "community 
spouse's income" within subsection (e)(2)(C). The Clearys 
contend that only Carolyne's personal income (for instance, 
her social security check) may be considered for this 
purpose and that the MCCA mandates a transfer of the 
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couple's resources in an amount sufficient to generate 
income to make up any shortfall. New Jersey argues that, 
prior to a transfer of any additional resources to meet the 
community spouse's needs, the MCCA permits the state to 
consider any income the institutionalized spouse may 
transfer to the community spouse. 
 
States have adopted different methods of implementing 
the SIP. Some use a resource-first method; others, like New 
Jersey, an income-first approach. Under the latter method, 
adjustments can be made to resources only after taking 
into account income transferred from the institutionalized 
spouse. When a hearing officer considers the sufficiency of 
the CSRA to meet the community spouse's MMMNA, the 
hearing officer may consider as part of the "community 
spouse's income" a contribution of the institutionalized 
spouse's income. The New Jersey statute provides for this 
in the following language: 
 
Post-eligibility treatment of income: institutionalized 
individuals: 
 
        (d) When the institutionalized individual's in come 
       is insufficient to provide the maximum authorized 
       deduction for the community spouse, either the 
       institutionalized spouse or the community spouse 
       can request a fair hearing in accordance with the 
       N.J.A.C. 10:71-8.4. If either member can establish at 
       the fair hearing that the income generated by the 
       community spouse's share of the couple's resources 
       is inadequate to raise the community spouse's 
       income (together with the community spouse 
       maintenance deduction) to the maximum authorized 
       level, additional resources (beyond the community 
       spouse's share as established at N.J.A.C. 10:71-48) 
       may be set aside for the community spouse. The 
       amount of resources to be set aside shall be that 
       amount that is determined sufficient to generate 
       sufficient income to raise the community spouse's 
       gross income to the maximum authorized level. 
 
N.J.A.C. 10:71-5.7(d). 
 
The Clearys maintain that this statutory language which 
permits the transfer of income from the institutionalized 
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spouse to make up part of a "community spouse 
maintenance deduction" contravenes the plain language of 
the MCCA. The Clearys contend that the MCCA follows the 
"name on the check" rule. Following this approach, they 
assert, income of the institutionalized spouse cannot be 
considered "community spouse's income" for purposes of 
subsection (e)(2)(C). 
 
To resolve this dispute, we must interpret "community 
spouse's income" as used in S 1396r-5(e)(2)(c). While the 
Federal agencies which administer the Act have not 
adopted formal regulations, neither have they remained 
silent. Both HCFA and HHS have stated in policy 
memoranda and letters that states may adopt either the 
income-first or the resource-first method and that 
subsection (e)(2)(C) permits consideration of potential 
income transfers from one spouse to another. In addition, 
these agencies have stated that the resource-first method, 
although permissible, is not mandatory.3  Nevertheless, the 
Clearys argue that New Jersey has run afoul of Federal 
standards in its implementation of the Act. 
 
In considering this question, we will look first at the 
statute and, using traditional tools of statutory 
construction, determine if Congressional intent is apparent. 
If we can do so, we must give effect to that intent. Reich v. 
Local 30, IBT, 6 F.3d 978, 986, citing, I.N.S. v. Cardoza- 
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987), and Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842-43 (1984). But, where "the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question 
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. 
at 843. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See HCFA State Medicaid Manual, HCFA-Pub. 45, S 3262.3, 
interpreting the Spousal Impoverishment Provisions and indicating that 
states should adopt an income-first approach. See also memoranda to 
states indicating that either resource-first or income-first may be used, 
HCFA Memorandum from Medicaid Bureau Director Sally Richardson 
(March 1994), Joint Appendix ("JA") at 99-100; HCFA Letter to 
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (April 1994), JA at 101-103; 
Chicago Regional State Letter 22-94 (July 1994), JA at 103-04; Letter for 
Donna E. Shalala to George V. Voinovich (March 1996), JA at 105. 
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We agree with the District Court that the statute is 
complex and contains many interrelated provisions that 
make it impossible to attach a plain meaning to provisions 
in isolation. As such we find the definition of"community 
spouse's income" to be ambiguous within the context of 
subsection (e)(2)(C). As a result, we must go on to examine 
the purposes of the Act and the interpretation proffered by 
the administering agencies. Because, however, the views of 
the administering agencies in this case are not made in 
formal regulations, we are confronted with another 
question: What level of deference should we grant to the 
agency interpretation? 
 
Where an agency has promulgated rules pursuant to 
notice and comment procedures, the Supreme Court has 
held that courts must defer to the agency's reasonable 
interpretation. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. The task becomes 
more complicated when the agency's interpretation is 
contained in informal views or guidelines outside the course 
of notice and comment procedures. We have questioned 
what degree of deference, if any, to afford an agency's views 
in this context. Reich, 6 F.3d at 986; E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co. v. C.I.R., 41 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1994), 
aff'd sub nom. Conoco, Inc. v. C.I.R., 42 F.3d 972 (5th Cir. 
1995); Sekula v. F.D.I.C., 39 F.3d 448, 453 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron , courts 
have deferred to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a 
statute over which that agency has been granted 
administrative and lawmaking authority. Chevron, 467 U.S. 
at 844. In the wake of Chevron, a great body of commentary 
has emerged regarding the extent of this deference. See, 
Sunstein, "Law and Administration After Chevron", 90 
Colum. L. Rev. 2071 (1990). Despite dispute as to Chevron's 
scope, the principles announced there center on the 
institutional competence of agencies to make factual 
determinations and resolve issues of policy. As the 
Supreme Court stated in Chevron, where a statute is 
ambiguous and Congressional intent is not clear, agencies 
promulgating reasonable interpretations, while exercising 
their delegated rulemaking authority, will be granted 
deference to those reasonable interpretations. 
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The agency views at issue here are not, however, formal 
regulations promulgated pursuant to notice and comment 
rulemaking. In such cases, we have questioned whether 
Chevron deference applies. Therefore, we must determine 
the degree of deference, if any, that is warranted. 
 
The Supreme Court has stated that, where an 
administrative agency's interpretation is registered in 
informal views, as long as that agency has a delegated 
authority to administer the statute and the views are made 
"in pursuance of official duty, based upon more specialized 
experience and broader investigations and information than 
is likely to come to a judge", then those views warrant some 
deference. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944). In Skidmore, the Court decided that employees of a 
packing plant were entitled to overtime pay for night-time 
duty even though most of the time was spent idle. In so 
holding, the Court relied on the informal views of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act Administration that had determined 
that waiting during night duty was akin to work. The Court 
decided that, although the Administration's views were not 
contained in formal rules and "while not controlling upon 
the court by reason of their authority, they do constitute a 
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts 
and litigants may properly resort for guidance." Id. How 
much guidance and weight depends, however, on the 
"thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of 
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power 
to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id. 
 
Because the Supreme Court's decision in Skidmore 
precedes Chevron by more than 40 years, the question 
arises whether Chevron's deference principle with regard to 
legislative rules (those made pursuant to notice and 
comment procedures) replaces the reasoning of Skidmore. 
We have noted repeatedly that Skidmore and its progeny 
were not expressly overruled by Chevron. See Reich, 6 F.3d 
at 987; Sekula, 39 F.3d at 453; International Raw Materials, 
Ltd. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 978 F.2d 1318 n.9 (3d Cir. 
1992). 
 
We have tested interpretative rules against the principles 
enunciated in Skidmore and determined that, if an agency 
 
                                13 
  
has been granted administrative authority by Congress for 
a statute, its interpretation -- despite arising in an informal 
context -- will be given deference as long as it is consistent 
with other agency pronouncements and furthers the 
purposes of the Act.4 Most recently, in Elizabeth Blackwell 
Health Center for Women v. Knoll, we concluded that 
interpretive rules by an agency with lawmaking authority 
(as opposed to legislative rules) will get deference even if the 
agency's interpretation is not made pursuant to that 
lawmaking authority. 61 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 1995) (directive 
from HCFA giving guidance to states about Medicaid plans 
is an interpretative rule and gets deference when 
reasonable). 
 
The interpretations that form the basis for New Jersey's 
implementation in this case are contained in informal views 
from the agency with the statutory mandate to administer 
the Act. The case law clearly provides that these views will 
receive some deference by the court if they are consistent 
with the plain language and purposes of the statute and if 
they are consistent with prior administrative views. 
 
In this case, we have an ambiguous statute as well as 
agency views that are informal and not made subject to 
notice and comment procedures. But the agency involved 
has delegated authority under the statute to administer the 
Act and therefore satisfies the requirement that a 
precondition to Chevron deference is a congressional 
delegation of administrative authority. See Adams Fruit Co., 
Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990). Under the 
Skidmore analysis outlined above, we must probe further to 
determine whether the interpretation is consistent and 
contemporaneous with other pronouncements of the agency 
and whether it is reasonable given the language and 
purpose of the Act. We have made such an assessment, 
reviewing the above factors in the order that they are made 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. See Sekula, 39 F.3d at 453 (Resolution Trust Corporation 
interpretation made in context of legislative rulemaking gets deference); 
and, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 41 F.3d at 135 (if the secretary has 
delegated rule making authority and there has been no prejudice from 
delay between enactment of the statute and interpretation it will receive 
deference if reasonable.) 
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in the Clearys' arguments. For the reasons we state below, 
we conclude that the informal views of the agencies should 
be given deference. 
 
The Clearys' primary contention is that the granting to 
states of discretion to adopt an income-first rule runs 
contrary to the statute's plain language. The crux of their 
argument is that "income" as used in the statute is 
confined to the "name on the check" rule. We disagree. 
 
To support their position of what constitutes Carolyne 
Cleary's income, the Clearys cite to the SIP definition of 
income in 42 U.S.C. S 1396r-5(b)(2). The Clearys contend 
that under the income provisions in subsection (b)(2), no 
income from the institutionalized spouse should be deemed 
available to the community spouse as this would violate 
subsection (b)(2)'s "name on the check rule." 
 
Subsection (b) does indeed incorporate the "name on the 
check" rule. Basically, any income payment made solely in 
a spouse's name (either the institutionalized or the 
community spouse) is considered income available only to 
the named spouse. If an income payment is made in the 
names of both spouses, half of it is considered available to 
each spouse. 
 
Why the Clearys argument fails lies in the fact that the 
income provisions of S 1396r-5(b)(2) do not apply to a 
revision of resources under S 1396r-5(e)(2)(C). Subsection 
(b) applies "in determining the income of an 
institutionalized spouse or community spouse for purposes 
of the post-eligibility income determination described in 
subsection (d)." And subsection (d), S 1396r-5(d), to which 
subsection (b) refers, is entitled "Protecting Income for 
Community Spouse." Subsection (d) defines the allowances 
which will be offset from the income of the institutionalized 
spouse before that income will be applied to pay for 
institutionalization costs. One such allowance is the 
community spouse monthly income allowance -- to the 
extent that it comes from the income of the institutionalized 
spouse. Subsection (d) defines the community spouse 
monthly income allowance as the difference between the 
MMMNA and whatever income the community spouse 
generates on her own. Subsection (b) then computes the 
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community spouse's MMMNA, which, as we describe above, 
is designed to keep the community spouse living above the 
poverty line. This statutory language makes it clear that a 
certain portion of the community spouse's income may 
come from the income of the institutionalized spouse. 
 
In addition, some, or all, of the community spouse's self- 
generated income will be income from the CSRA. The 
couple may not, however, be happy with the amount of the 
CSRA, either as originally computed or as changed 
circumstances may affect it. Subsection (e)(2)(C) then 
provides for a revision of the CSRA if either spouse 
establishes that the CSRA is inadequate to raise the 
community spouse's income to the MMMNA. Nevertheless, 
in computing the community spouse's total income, one 
cannot focus only on the income generated by the CSRA 
and ignore the other sources of income defined in 
subsections (b) and (d). 
 
We agree with the District Court that to conflate the 
detailed provisions dealing with income in subsection (d) 
with the resource revisions procedure addressed in 
subsection (e) would run contrary to the statute. The 
purpose of subsection (d) is to make available to the 
community spouse so much of the institutionalized 
spouse's income as is necessary to ensure her monthly 
need. We agree that "it would be anomalous to construe 
(e)(2)(C) in such a manner as to exclude the 
institutionalized spouse's income from the calculation." 
Cleary v. Waldman, 959 F. Supp. 222, 232 (D. N.J. 1997). 
The reading advanced by the Clearys would make (d) 
superfluous. 
 
Moreover, the Act does make an explicit reference to a 
transfer of income from one spouse to another. In 
determining the amount of the institutionalized spouse's 
income that will be applied to the payment of the costs of 
the institution, subsection (d) provides that, first, the 
community spouse's monthly income allowance, to the 
extent that it is paid by the institutionalized spouse, will be 
deducted from the institutionalized spouse's income. This 
deduction will be made before the institutionalized spouse 
must contribute to medical costs. This language in 
subsection (d) demonstrates that the "name on the check" 
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principle will not prevent allocation under the SIP of the 
institutionalized spouse's income for the needs of the 
community spouse. 
 
The Clearys argue, however, that the plain language of 
the MCCA guarantees the community spouse an "adequate 
amount of resources to provide the MMMNA." They contend 
that this means that a greater share of the couple's 
resources should go to the community spouse in the event 
she can not meet her monthly need. The Clearys rely on 
language in subsection (e) that provides that, if either 
spouse is dissatisfied with the CSRA and can establish that 
the amount of income generated by it for the community 
spouse is inadequate to meet the community spouse's 
MMMNA, "there shall be substituted, for the [CSRA] under 
subsection (f)(2) of this section, an amount adequate to 
provide such a minimum monthly maintenance needs 
allowance." S 1396r-5(e)(2). 
 
The Clearys rely on the words "substituted" and "an 
amount adequate" for their argument that any shortfall 
between the community spouse's income and the MMMNA 
must be made up by allocating more income from a larger 
share of resources to generate more income. 
 
This argument ignores the import of the fair hearing 
process embedded within the Act. Subsection (e)(2)(A) 
permits a "fair hearing" if either spouse is dissatisfied with 
the determination of any one of the five components that 
create the community spouses's income: the community 
spouse monthly income allowance (from the 
institutionalized spouse), the amount of monthly income 
otherwise available to the community spouse, the 
computation of the spousal share of resources, the 
attribution of resources, and the determination of the 
CSRA. Subsection (e)(2)(B) provides for the revision of the 
MMMNA. Subsection (e)(2)(C) then provides for a revision of 
the CSRA if either spouse "establishes that the community 
spouse resource allowance (in relation to the amount of 
income generated by such an allowance) is inadequate to 
raise the community spouse's income to the minimum 
monthly maintenance needs allowance . . .." 
 
The fact that the "fair hearing" subsection, (e)(2), starts in 
(e)(2)(A) with a recitation of the five components that make 
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up the community spouse's income would indicate that a 
revision of one of those components, the CSRA, should be 
made only with a consideration of the other four. The five 
elements are interrelated and an adjustment of one will 
affect the other four. For this reason, a spouse may not be 
able to demonstrate an inadequacy of the CSRA, pursuant 
to (e)(2)(C), if a larger community spouse monthly income 
allowance is possible. 
 
This interpretation of the language of subsection (e)(2) is 
consistent with the legislative history. Congress intended in 
subsection (e)(2)(C) that an "adequate" amount of resources 
to provide for the monthly need would occur after taking 
into account any other income attributable to the community 
spouse. House Conf. Rep. No. 100-661, at 256, reprinted in 
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 923,1043. 
 
The Clearys also contend, however, that New Jersey's 
income-first rule violates the purpose of the Act. They 
assert that the Act was designed with people like 
themselves in mind -- those who will exhaust their 
retirement savings by paying for long-term care expenses. 
 
The Clearys are correct that, with the Spousal 
Impoverishment Provisions, Congress was addressing the 
problem of scarce resources for health care expenditures for 
the elderly. The legislative history refers to the ballooning 
costs of health care for the elderly and the inadequacy of 
the existing Medicare structures to deal with them. 5 The 
purpose of the MCCA was to address these increasing costs 
and the disparity between what Medicare would and would 
not pay for. H.R. No. 100-105(I), at 8 (1988), reprinted in 
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 803, 810. 
 
An important Congressional consideration at the time the 
MCCA's adoption was the dual problems of scarce Medicare 
and Medicaid resources and an aging population. But it 
was also evident that Congress did not intend the MCCA to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. "Greater life expectancy merely postpones the inevitable need for care 
of chronic and terminal illnesses....Expenditures for personal health care 
services for the elderly nearly tripled between 1977 and 1984, rising 
from $43 billion to an estimated $120 billion." H.R. No. 100-105(I), at 8, 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 803, 810. 
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be a final solution. The bill directs the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services to conduct research on long-term care 
delivery. Congress apparently recognized the problem of 
long-term care financing was in its nascent stages, and that 
Medicaid, the sole source of financing for long-term care, 
must cover a broad range of income groups. 
 
       The leading cause of financial catastrophe among the 
       elderly is the need for long-term care, especially the 
       need for nursing home placement. The expense of 
       nursing home care which can range from $2,000 to 
       $3,000 per month or more-has the potential for rapidly 
       depleting the lifetime savings of all but the wealthiest. 
 
Id. at 888. 
 
Indeed, Medicaid is not just for the poorest among us. It 
must be available to assist an ever-increasing number of 
the medically needy. Granting discretion to the states to 
implement the Act according to their resources, priorities, 
and populations furthered this purpose by preserving as 
many Medicaid resources as possible. 
 
The Clearys maintain, however, that the legislative 
history supports a resource-first approach. Again, we 
disagree. The Spousal Impoverishment Provisions originated 
in the House and contained no resource revision provision. 
Under the House bill, the only sources of income available 
to meet the community spouse's monthly need were the 
community spouse's own income, (e.g., social security), any 
income generated by the CSRA, and any transfers of 
income from the institutionalized spouse (e.g., the 
community spouse monthly income allowance). 
 
The Senate bill added a provision reducing the resources 
available to the institutionalized spouse by an amount 
necessary to achieve the monthly need of the community 
spouse. The Senate did not, however, consider a transfer of 
income from the institutionalized spouse. The Senate bill 
also included a provision for a hearing to increase the 
MMMNA or the CSRA if either was inadequate to support 
the community spouse. The Clearys argue that the Senate 
bill accurately reflects the will of the Congress and the 
meaning of the MCCA. 
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The problem with this argument is that the Conference 
Committee adopted neither the House nor the Senate 
versions of the bill. Unlike the House bill, the Conference 
Committee provided an adjustment to the resource 
allowance in order to meet the community spouse's 
monthly need. But, unlike the Senate bill, the Conference 
Committee did not achieve this adjustment by shifting more 
resources toward the community spouse. Instead, the 
Conference version provided for the fair hearing process in 
subsection (e)(2), which permits a reconsideration of any 
one of the five components of the community spouse's 
income in subsection (e)(2)(A) and allows a revision of the 
CSRA in subsection (e)(2)(C). As we discuss above, 
subsection (e)(2)(C) should be read as a part of the entire 
"fair hearing" subsection. 
 
The Clearys seize upon the inclusion of the fair hearing 
provision as an implicit adoption of the Senate's view that 
more resources should go to the community spouse in the 
event of a shortfall. But, this argument fails for the reasons 
we state above. Indeed, the Conference Committee gave no 
indication of an intent to augment the CSRA before 
increasing the community spouse monthly income 
allowance. The Conference Report speaks to the 
responsibility of the state to allow the community spouse to 
retain an "adequate" amount of resources to provide for her 
monthly need after "taking into account any other income 
attributable to the community spouse." House Conf. Rep. 
No. 100-661, at 265, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 923, 
1043.  
 
We are mindful of the daunting crisis which long-term 
care costs pose even to those who have saved for their 
retirement. The prospect of a growing elderly population in 
America, who are impoverished by these costs, prompted 
Congress to enact the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act. 
But, the MCCA creates a federal state cooperative venture 
for the provision of Medicaid assistance to the medically 
and categorically needy. The statute permits states to 
implement their own programs as long as they do so in 
accordance with the federal statute and its applicable 
regulations. 
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The Health Care Financing Administration and the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services 
have clearly stated their views, albeit in policy letters, that 
the states should have the discretion to employ either an 
income-first or a resource-first method. As we have shown, 
this policy conforms to the language of the statute, to its 
legislative history, and to the purpose for which it was 
enacted. Moreover, these agencies have statutory authority 
to administer the Act, and their policy is a reasonable 
interpretation consistent with the plain language and stated 
purposes of the statute. We will, therefore, grant deference 
to this view. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
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